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dc.contributor.authorHong, Sunghoonen
dc.date.accessioned2011-06-03-
dc.date.accessioned2011-12-15T11:34:03Z-
dc.date.available2011-12-15T11:34:03Z-
dc.date.issued2011-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/53369-
dc.description.abstractWe develop a strategic model of network interdiction in a non-cooperative game of flow. An adversary, endowed with a bounded quantity of bads, chooses a flow specifying a plan for carrying bads through a network from a base to a target. Simultaneously, an agency chooses a blockage specifying a plan for blocking the transport of bads through arcs in the network. The bads carried to the target cause a target loss while the blocked arcs cause a network loss. The adversary earns and the agency loses from both target loss and network loss. The adversary incurs the expense of carrying bads. In this model we study Nash equilibria and find a power law relation between the probability and the extent of the target loss. Our model contributes to the literature of game theory by introducing non-cooperative behavior into a Kalai-Zemel (cooperative) game of flow. Our research also advances models and results on network interdiction.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aFondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM) |cMilanoen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aNota di Lavoro |x43.2011en
dc.subject.jelC72en
dc.subject.jelD85en
dc.subject.jelH56en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordNetwork Interdictionen
dc.subject.keywordNoncooperative Game of Flowen
dc.subject.keywordNash Equilibriumen
dc.subject.keywordPower Lawen
dc.subject.keywordKalai-Zemel Game of Flowen
dc.titleStrategic network interdiction-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn661239136en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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