Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/53350 
Year of Publication: 
2011
Series/Report no.: 
Nota di Lavoro No. 65.2011
Publisher: 
Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM), Milano
Abstract: 
Data on the growth performances of countries with similar comparative (dis)advantage and political institutions reveal a striking variation across world regions. While some former autocracies such as the East Asian growth miracles have done remarkably well, others such as the Latin American economies have grown at much lower rates. In this paper, we propose a political economy explanation of these diverging paths of development by addressing the preferences of the country's political elite. We build a theoretical framework where factors of production owned by the political elites differ across countries. In each country, the incumbent autocrat will cater to the preferences of the elites when setting trade policy and the property rights regime. We show how stronger property rights may lead to capital accumulation and labor reallocation to the manufacturing sector. This, in turn, can lead to a shift in the comparative advantage, a decision to open up to trade and an inflow of more productive foreign capital. Consistent with a set of stylised facts on East Asia and Latin America, we argue that strong property rights are crucial for success upon globalization.
Subjects: 
Autocracy
Growth
Political Elites
Landowners
Capitalists
Growth Miracles
Trade
Comparative Advantage
Capital Mobility
Property Rights
JEL: 
F10
F20
P14
P16
O10
O24
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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