Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
Full metadata record
DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorAnsink, Eriken_US
dc.contributor.authorWeikard, Hans-Peteren_US
dc.description.abstractWe analyse the redistribution of a resource among agents who have claims to the resource and who are ordered linearly. A well known example of this particular situation is the river sharing problem. We exploit the linear order of agents to transform the river sharing problem to a sequence of two-agent river sharing problems. These reduced problems are mathematically equivalent to bankruptcy problems and can therefore be solved using any bankruptcy rule. Our proposed class of solutions, that we call sequential sharing rules, solves the river sharing problem. Our approach extends the bankruptcy literature to settings with a sequential structure of both the agents and the resource to be shared. In the paper, we first characterise a class of sequential sharing rules. Subsequently, we apply sequential sharing rules based on four classical bankruptcy rules, assess their properties, and compare them to four alternative solutions to the river sharing problem.en_US
dc.publisher|aFondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM) |cMilanoen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aNota di lavoro // Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei: Sustainable development |x114.2009en_US
dc.subject.keywordRiver Sharing Problemen_US
dc.subject.keywordSequential Sharing Ruleen_US
dc.subject.keywordBankruptcy Problemen_US
dc.subject.keywordWater Allocationen_US
dc.titleSequential sharing rules for river sharing problemsen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US

Files in This Item:
297.75 kB

Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.