Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
Full metadata record
DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorVannetelbosch, Vincenten_US
dc.contributor.authorCaulier, Jean-Françoisen_US
dc.contributor.authorMauleon, Anaen_US
dc.description.abstractWe develop a theoretical framework that allows us to study which bilateral links and coalition structures are going to emerge at equilibrium. We define the notion of coalitional network to represent a network and a coalition structure, where the network specifies the nature of the relationship each individual has with his coalition members and with individuals outside his coalition. To predict the coalitional networks that are going to emerge at equilibrium we propose the concept of contractual stability which requires that any change made to the coalitional network needs the consent of both the deviating players and their original coalition partners. We show that there always exists a contractually stable coalitional network under the simple majority decision rule and the component-wise egalitarian or majoritarian allocation rules. Moreover, requiring the consent of group members may help to reconcile stability and efficiency.en_US
dc.publisher|aFondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM) |cMilanoen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aNota di lavoro // Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei: Sustainable development |x47.2009en_US
dc.subject.keywordCoalition Structuresen_US
dc.subject.keywordContractual Stabilityen_US
dc.subject.keywordAllocation Rulesen_US
dc.titleContractually stable networksen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US

Files in This Item:
353.08 kB

Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.