Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/53261 
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dc.contributor.authorKinateder, Markusen
dc.date.accessioned2011-12-15T11:32:06Z-
dc.date.available2011-12-15T11:32:06Z-
dc.date.issued2009-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/53261-
dc.description.abstractTwo project leaders (or entrepreneurs) in a network, which captures social relations, recruit players in a strategic, competitive and time-limited process. Each team has an optimal size depending on the project's quality. This is a random variable with a commonly known distribution. Only the corresponding project leader observes its realization. Any decision is only observed by the involved agents. The set of pure strategy Sequential Equilibria is characterized by giving an algorithm that selects one equilibrium at a time. An agent's expected payoff is related to his position in the network, though no centrality measure in the literature captures this relation. A social planner frequently would achieve a higher welfare.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aFondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM) |cMilanoen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aNota di Lavoro |x36.2009en
dc.subject.jelC72en
dc.subject.jelC73en
dc.subject.jelD85en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordDynamic Competitive Group Formationen
dc.subject.keywordImperfect Informationen
dc.titleTeam formation in a network-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn645065609en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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