Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/53261
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dc.contributor.authorKinateder, Markusen_US
dc.date.accessioned2011-12-15T11:32:06Z-
dc.date.available2011-12-15T11:32:06Z-
dc.date.issued2009en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/53261-
dc.description.abstractTwo project leaders (or entrepreneurs) in a network, which captures social relations, recruit players in a strategic, competitive and time-limited process. Each team has an optimal size depending on the project's quality. This is a random variable with a commonly known distribution. Only the corresponding project leader observes its realization. Any decision is only observed by the involved agents. The set of pure strategy Sequential Equilibria is characterized by giving an algorithm that selects one equilibrium at a time. An agent's expected payoff is related to his position in the network, though no centrality measure in the literature captures this relation. A social planner frequently would achieve a higher welfare.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aFondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM) |cMilanoen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aNota di lavoro // Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei: Sustainable development |x36.2009en_US
dc.subject.jelC72en_US
dc.subject.jelC73en_US
dc.subject.jelD85en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordDynamic Competitive Group Formationen_US
dc.subject.keywordImperfect Informationen_US
dc.titleTeam formation in a networken_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn645065609en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US

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