Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/53245 
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dc.contributor.authorDi Corato, Lucaen
dc.date.accessioned2011-12-01-
dc.date.accessioned2011-12-15T11:31:51Z-
dc.date.available2011-12-15T11:31:51Z-
dc.date.issued2011-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/53245-
dc.description.abstractIn this paper we study the optimal forest conservation policy by a hyperbolically discounting society. Society comprises a series of non-overlapping imperfectly altruistic generations each represented by its own government. Under uncertainty about future pay-offs we determine, as solution of an intergenerational dynamic game, the optimal timing of irreversible harvest. Earlier harvest occurs and the option value attached to the forest clearing decision is eroded under both the assumptions of naïve and sophisticated belief about future time-preferences. This results in a bias toward the current generation gratification which affects the intergenerational allocation of benefits and costs from harvesting and conserving a natural forest.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aFondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM) |cMilanoen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aNota di Lavoro |x89.2011en
dc.subject.jelD81en
dc.subject.jelC70en
dc.subject.jelQ23en
dc.subject.jelQ58en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordImperfect Altruismen
dc.subject.keywordReal Optionsen
dc.subject.keywordHyperbolic Discountingen
dc.subject.keywordTime Inconsistencyen
dc.subject.keywordNatural Resources Managementen
dc.titleOptimal conservation policy under imperfect intergenerational altruism-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn675907691en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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