Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/53238 
Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2009
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Nota di Lavoro No. 83.2009
Verlag: 
Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM), Milano
Zusammenfassung: 
We study coalitional games where the proceeds from cooperation depend on the entire coalition structure. The coalition structure core (Kóczy, 2007) is a generalisation of the coalition structure core for such games. We introduce a noncooperative, sequential coalition formation model and show that the set of equilibrium outcomes coincides with the recursive core. In order to extend past results to games that are not totally balanced (understood in this special setting) we introduce subgame-consistency that requires perfectness in relevant subgames only, while subgames that are never reached are ignored.
Schlagwörter: 
Partition Function
Externalities
Implementation
Recursive Core
Stationary Perfect Equilibrium
Time Consistent Equilibrium
JEL: 
C71
C72
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
339.28 kB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.