Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/53238
Authors: 
Kóczy, László Á.
Year of Publication: 
2009
Series/Report no.: 
Nota di lavoro // Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei: Sustainable development 83.2009
Abstract: 
We study coalitional games where the proceeds from cooperation depend on the entire coalition structure. The coalition structure core (Kóczy, 2007) is a generalisation of the coalition structure core for such games. We introduce a noncooperative, sequential coalition formation model and show that the set of equilibrium outcomes coincides with the recursive core. In order to extend past results to games that are not totally balanced (understood in this special setting) we introduce subgame-consistency that requires perfectness in relevant subgames only, while subgames that are never reached are ignored.
Subjects: 
Partition Function
Externalities
Implementation
Recursive Core
Stationary Perfect Equilibrium
Time Consistent Equilibrium
JEL: 
C71
C72
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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