Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/53200 
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dc.contributor.authorBiermann, Florian M.en
dc.date.accessioned2011-06-03-
dc.date.accessioned2011-12-15T11:31:09Z-
dc.date.available2011-12-15T11:31:09Z-
dc.date.issued2011-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/53200-
dc.description.abstractIn matching markets the number of blocking pairs is often used as a criterion to compare matchings. We argue that this criterion is lacking an economic interpretation: In many circumstances it will neither reflect the expected extent of partner changes, nor will it capture the satisfaction of the players with the matching. As an alternative, we set up two principles which single out a particularly disruptive subcollection of blocking pairs. We propose to take the cardinality of that subset as a measure to compare matchings. This cardinality has an economic interpretation: the subset is a justified objection against the given matching according to a bargaining set characterization of the set of stable matchings. We prove multiple properties relevant for a workable measure of comparison.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aFondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM) |cMilanoen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aNota di Lavoro |x41.2011en
dc.subject.jelC0en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordStable Marriage Problemen
dc.subject.keywordMatchingen
dc.subject.keywordBlocking Pairen
dc.subject.keywordInstabilityen
dc.subject.keywordMatching Comparisonen
dc.subject.keywordDecentralized Marketen
dc.subject.keywordBargaining Seten
dc.titleA measure to compare matchings in marriage markets-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn661236382en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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