Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/53168 
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dc.contributor.authorFumagalli, Chiaraen
dc.contributor.authorMotta, Massimoen
dc.contributor.authorRønde, Thomasen
dc.date.accessioned2011-12-15T11:30:22Z-
dc.date.available2011-12-15T11:30:22Z-
dc.date.issued2009-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/53168-
dc.description.abstractThis paper studies a model where exclusive dealing (ED) can both promote investment and foreclose a more efficient supplier. While investment promotion is usually regarded as a pro-competitive effect of ED, our paper shows that it may be the very reason why a contract that forecloses a more efficient supplier is signed. Absent the effect on investment, the contract would not be signed and foreclosure would not be a concern. For this reason, considering potential foreclosure and investment promotion in isolation and then summing them up may not be a suitable approach to assess the net effect of ED. The paper therefore invites a more cautious attitude towards accepting possible investment promotion arguments as a defence for ED.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aFondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM) |cMilanoen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aNota di Lavoro |x120.2009en
dc.subject.jelL12en
dc.subject.jelL40en
dc.subject.jelL42en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordMonopolization Practicesen
dc.subject.keywordVertical Agreementsen
dc.titleExclusive dealing: the interaction between foreclosure and investment promotion-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn646496905en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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