Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/53068
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dc.contributor.authorLigon, Ethanen_US
dc.date.accessioned2011-12-14T09:47:21Z-
dc.date.available2011-12-14T09:47:21Z-
dc.date.issued2002en_US
dc.identifier.isbn9291901350en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/53068-
dc.description.abstractThe standard method of testing for efficient risk-sharing in village economies does not allow one to identify vulnerable households, only to make statements about the average risk in the village, or of sub-groups identifiable on the basis of observables. Here, by working directly with inter-household consumption correlations we are able to identify households, which are probably exposed to unusually high amount of idiosyncratic risk. An obvious use for this identifying information involves targeted interventions to help those households. However, the effectiveness of these interventions depends on the market imperfections which exposes those households to idiosyncratic risk to begin with. Using data from the Indian ICRISAT villages, we trace out the expected outcomes of targeted income transfers given several different hypotheses regarding why some households bear idiosyncratic risk. – targeting ; informal insurance ; risken_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aUNU-WIDER |cHelsinkien_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aWIDER Discussion Papers // World Institute for Development Economics (UNU-WIDER) |x2002/08en_US
dc.subject.jelI32en_US
dc.subject.jelO1en_US
dc.subject.jelD80en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.stwDorfwirtschaften_US
dc.subject.stwArmuten_US
dc.subject.stwRisikoen_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titleTargeting and informal insuranceen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn345964608en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US

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