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dc.contributor.authorAddison, Tonyen
dc.contributor.authorMurshed, S. Mansooben
dc.date.accessioned2011-12-14T09:45:57Z-
dc.date.available2011-12-14T09:45:57Z-
dc.date.issued2001-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/53010-
dc.description.abstractThe paper analyses credibility and reputation in the context of peace negotiations. Where war provides economic gains to one side, peace is not incentive compatible, and peace agreements will necessarily degenerate, as they become time inconsistent. Levels of conflict are an increasing function of greed and rents, but decreasing in the direct costs of war. In a multiple period framework there is some uncertainty regarding the type of negotiator and for high values of the discount rate more conflict is chosen. Sanctions, aid and direct intervention, if effective, could eliminate conflict, as well as help in devising commitment technologies.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aThe United Nations University World Institute for Development Economics Research (UNU-WIDER) |cHelsinkien
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aWIDER Discussion Paper |x2001/45en
dc.subject.jelO10en
dc.subject.jelO55en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordpeace agreementsen
dc.subject.keywordcredibilityen
dc.subject.keywordreputationen
dc.subject.keywordconflicten
dc.subject.keywordaiden
dc.subject.stwFriedenen
dc.subject.stwVerhandlungstheorieen
dc.subject.stwGlaubwürdigkeiten
dc.subject.stwReputationen
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.titleCredibility and reputation in peacemaking-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn333441516en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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