Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/52975 
Full metadata record
DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorBerthélemy, Jean-Claudeen
dc.date.accessioned2011-12-14T09:45:04Z-
dc.date.available2011-12-14T09:45:04Z-
dc.date.issued2001-
dc.identifier.isbn9291900338en
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/52975-
dc.description.abstractIn this paper, I discuss the incentives that the HIPC Initiative could create in debtor countries in favour of economic adjustment and reform. The usual debt-overhang argument, stating that debt relief will increase the net benefits of reforms, needs to be revisited in this context. First, the HIPC Initiative does not provide pure debt relief, but also creates new public spending obligations on poverty reduction programmes. Second, not all HIPCs can be considered as enjoying good economic governance, while the debt-overhang argument assumes a welfare-maximizing government. I show that standard positive incentives can be obtained only in good economic governance instances. I suggest that, in other instances, the outcome of HIPC programmes could be improved if external shocks were taken into account in their design.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aThe United Nations University World Institute for Development Economics Research (UNU-WIDER) |cHelsinkien
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aWIDER Discussion Paper |x2001/105en
dc.subject.jelF34en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keyworddebt overhangen
dc.subject.keywordincentivesen
dc.subject.keywordsocial expenditureen
dc.subject.keywordinvestmenten
dc.subject.stwSchuldenerlassen
dc.subject.stwEntwicklungsländeren
dc.titleHIPC debt relief and policy reform incentives-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn336657064en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

Files in This Item:
File
Size





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.