Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/52975
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dc.contributor.authorBerthélemy, Jean-Claudeen_US
dc.date.accessioned2011-12-14T09:45:04Z-
dc.date.available2011-12-14T09:45:04Z-
dc.date.issued2001en_US
dc.identifier.isbn9291900338en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/52975-
dc.description.abstractIn this paper, I discuss the incentives that the HIPC Initiative could create in debtor countries in favour of economic adjustment and reform. The usual debt-overhang argument, stating that debt relief will increase the net benefits of reforms, needs to be revisited in this context. First, the HIPC Initiative does not provide pure debt relief, but also creates new public spending obligations on poverty reduction programmes. Second, not all HIPCs can be considered as enjoying good economic governance, while the debt-overhang argument assumes a welfare-maximizing government. I show that standard positive incentives can be obtained only in good economic governance instances. I suggest that, in other instances, the outcome of HIPC programmes could be improved if external shocks were taken into account in their design.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aUNU-WIDER |cHelsinkien_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aWIDER Discussion Papers // World Institute for Development Economics (UNU-WIDER) |x2001/105en_US
dc.subject.jelF34en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keyworddebt overhangen_US
dc.subject.keywordincentivesen_US
dc.subject.keywordsocial expenditureen_US
dc.subject.keywordinvestmenten_US
dc.subject.stwSchuldenerlassen_US
dc.subject.stwEntwicklungsländeren_US
dc.titleHIPC debt relief and policy reform incentivesen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn336657064en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US

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