Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/52885
Authors: 
Vaidya, Samarth
Year of Publication: 
2001
Series/Report no.: 
WIDER Discussion Papers // World Institute for Development Economics (UNU-WIDER) 2001/30
Abstract: 
In this paper I analyze the economic incentives that govern the strategic relationship between the government and the independent media using a consistent analytical framework. The analysis focuses on the extent to which the ‘free’ press can act as a deterrent to corruption in governance. I find that although ‘press freedom’ is indeed important as stressed in the existing literature, both mutually profitable cover-up arrangements as well as the government’s ability to ‘manage’ the media’s allegations tend to have a substantial negative impact on the media’s role as an effective watchdog. Also, more competition in the media sector need not necessarily translate into increased deterrence from corruption. – media ; corruption ; political accountability ; governance ; contest
JEL: 
D72
D74
D78
H57
K40
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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