Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/52694
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dc.contributor.authorLiang, Qiaoen_US
dc.contributor.authorHendrikse, George W. J.en_US
dc.contributor.authorHuang, Zuhuien_US
dc.date.accessioned2011-12-02en_US
dc.date.accessioned2011-12-09T15:33:38Z-
dc.date.available2011-12-09T15:33:38Z-
dc.date.issued2010en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/52694-
dc.description.abstractThis paper examines how farmers producing differentiated quality products choose different governance structures in a non-cooperative game between farmers, enterprises, and consumers. A cooperative and an IOF (investor owned firm) coexist in equilibrium and low quality is delivered by the cooperative. The trade-off between pooling and the elimination of the double markup determines the attractiveness of cooperatives compared to IOFs.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aLeibniz-Institut für Agrarentwicklung in Mittel- und Osteuropa (IAMO) |cHalle (Saale)en_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesIAMO Forum 2010, Halle (Saale), June 16 – 18, 2010: Institutions in Transition - Challenges for New Modes of Governanceen_US
dc.subject.jelC72en_US
dc.subject.jelL22en_US
dc.subject.jelQ13en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordQualityen_US
dc.subject.keywordCooperativesen_US
dc.subject.keywordInvestor-Owned Firmsen_US
dc.titleQuality provision and governance structure variety: Pooling versus double markupen_US
dc.typeConference Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn676455646en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:iamo10:52694-

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