Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/52694
Authors: 
Liang, Qiao
Hendrikse, George W. J.
Huang, Zuhui
Year of Publication: 
2010
Series/Report no.: 
IAMO Forum 2010, Halle (Saale), June 16 – 18, 2010: Institutions in Transition - Challenges for New Modes of Governance
Abstract: 
This paper examines how farmers producing differentiated quality products choose different governance structures in a non-cooperative game between farmers, enterprises, and consumers. A cooperative and an IOF (investor owned firm) coexist in equilibrium and low quality is delivered by the cooperative. The trade-off between pooling and the elimination of the double markup determines the attractiveness of cooperatives compared to IOFs.
Subjects: 
Quality
Cooperatives
Investor-Owned Firms
JEL: 
C72
L22
Q13
Document Type: 
Conference Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size
168.91 kB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.