Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/52466
Authors: 
Katsimi, Margarita
Sarantides, Vassilis
Year of Publication: 
2011
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo working paper: Public Choice 3570
Abstract: 
A growing literature suggests that office motivated politicians manipulate fiscal policy instruments in order to seek their re-election. This paper investigates the impact of electoral manipulation of the level and composition of fiscal policy on incumbent's re-election prospects. This impact is estimated for a panel of 21 OECD countries over the period 1972- 1999. Our results suggest that increased public investment during the term in office, as well as a shift in expenditures towards public investment can improve re-election prospects. On the contrary, election year manipulation via public investment does not affect re-election prospects. We also find that voters punish politicians who create deficits during elections, while deficits that proceed the election year have similar, although smaller effects on the reelection prospects.
Subjects: 
political budget cycles
elections
quality of public expenditure
public investment
JEL: 
D72
E62
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size
242.23 kB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.