Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/52433
Authors: 
Hebous, Shafik
Lipatov, Vilen
Year of Publication: 
2011
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo working paper: Public Finance 3620
Abstract: 
We sketch a model according to which tax havens attract corporate income generated in corrupted countries. In our framework, tax havens have two opposite effects on welfare. First, tax havens' services have a positive effect on welfare through encouraging investment by firms fearing expropriation and bribes in corrupt countries. Second, by supporting corruption and the concealment of officials' bribes, tax havens discourage the provision of public goods and hence have also a negative effect on welfare. The net welfare effect depends on the specified preferences and parameters. One source of this ambiguity is that the presence of multinational firms in corrupted countries is positively associated with demanding tax havens' operations. Using firm-level data, we provide empirical support for this hypothesis.
Subjects: 
tax havens
tax avoidance
tax evasion
multinational firms
corruption
JEL: 
F23
H25
H32
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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