Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/52426
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dc.contributor.authorBrueckner, Jan K.en_US
dc.contributor.authorPicard, Pierre M.en_US
dc.date.accessioned2011-10-06en_US
dc.date.accessioned2011-12-01T13:03:10Z-
dc.date.available2011-12-01T13:03:10Z-
dc.date.issued2011en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/52426-
dc.description.abstractIn this paper, we ask how antitrust immunity subject to a carve-out affects collusion incentives in international airline alliances. We show that the gains from economies of density due to higher interline traffic under the alliance strengthen the incentive to collude on the interhub segment, while the accompanying revenue gain heightens the incentive to defect from collusive behavior. These two effects exactly cancel in the case of linear demands and linear economies of density. Under this approximation, the incentives for interhub collusion are no different before and after the emergence of an airline alliance subject to a carve-out.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aCenter for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute (CESifo) |cMunichen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aCESifo working paper: Industrial Organisation |x3593en_US
dc.subject.jelL00en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordcollusionen_US
dc.subject.keywordcarve-outen_US
dc.titleAirline alliances, carve-outs and collusionen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn66943941Xen_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US

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