Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/52426 
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dc.contributor.authorBrueckner, Jan K.en
dc.contributor.authorPicard, Pierre M.en
dc.date.accessioned2011-10-06-
dc.date.accessioned2011-12-01T13:03:10Z-
dc.date.available2011-12-01T13:03:10Z-
dc.date.issued2011-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/52426-
dc.description.abstractIn this paper, we ask how antitrust immunity subject to a carve-out affects collusion incentives in international airline alliances. We show that the gains from economies of density due to higher interline traffic under the alliance strengthen the incentive to collude on the interhub segment, while the accompanying revenue gain heightens the incentive to defect from collusive behavior. These two effects exactly cancel in the case of linear demands and linear economies of density. Under this approximation, the incentives for interhub collusion are no different before and after the emergence of an airline alliance subject to a carve-out.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aCenter for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo) |cMunichen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aCESifo Working Paper |x3593en
dc.subject.jelL00en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordcollusionen
dc.subject.keywordcarve-outen
dc.titleAirline alliances, carve-outs and collusion-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn66943941Xen
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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