Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/52341 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2011
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
8th Asia-Pacific Regional Conference of the International Telecommunications Society (ITS): "Convergence in the Digital Age", Taipei, Taiwan, 26th-28th June, 2011
Verlag: 
International Telecommunications Society (ITS), Calgary
Zusammenfassung: 
We explore the separation of powers between the legislative and the executive branch of government as a way of overcoming the dynamic consistency problem of regulatory policy towards investment. We model the industry as a regulated duopoly. The incumbent is a vertically integrated firm that owns a wholesaler and a retailer. The entrant owns a retailer. Either retailer needs access to the input produced by the wholesaler to operate. The incumbent can make an investment that improves the quality of the input produced by the wholesaler. The regulator sets the access price and is unable to commit. The legislator sets the regulator's objective function and is able to commit. We derive general conditions under which having the legislator distort the regulator's objective function away from social welfare allows increasing the range of parameter values for which it is possible to induce socially desirable investment.
Schlagwörter: 
Investment
Dynamic Consistency
Regulator's Objective
JEL: 
L43
L51
L96
L98
Dokumentart: 
Conference Paper

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