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|dc.description.abstract||We consider a horizontally and vertically differentiated duopoly model in order to analyze both intra- and inter-platform competition in an always corvered broadband access market (Copper-Copper, Copper-FTTH and FTTH-FTTH competitions). The model is purely static and does not address dynamic efficiency issues. It shows that the access charges play a significant role in the migration from copper to FTTH and in FTTH investment incentives, provided that consumers are segmented. In FTTH-infrastructure-based competition, investment incentives tend to increase with the copper access charge, while in FTTH-servicebased competition, FTTH investment incentives are much more sensitive to the FTTH access charge than to the copper access charge. A comparison of FTTH-infrastructure-based and FTTH-service-based competition in terms of nationwide FTTH coverage and social welfare indicates that FTTH-infrastructure-based competition leads to a higher level of nationwide FTTH coverage and social welfare.||en_US|
|dc.relation.ispartofseries||8th International Telecommunications Society (ITS) Asia-Pacific Regional Conference, Taiwan, 26 - 28 June, 2011: Convergence in the Digital Age||en_US|
|dc.title||Role of access charges in the migration from copper to FTTH||en_US|
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