Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/52155 
Year of Publication: 
2011
Series/Report no.: 
22nd European Regional Conference of the International Telecommunications Society (ITS): "Innovative ICT Applications - Emerging Regulatory, Economic and Policy Issues", Budapest, Hungary, 18th-21st September, 2011
Publisher: 
International Telecommunications Society (ITS), Calgary
Abstract: 
National regulatory authorities (NRAs) attempt to encourage participation in spectrum assignments by enhancing entrants' likelihood of success. The question this study addresses is: Can NRA policy tools really affect the probability an entrant wins a 3G spectrum licence? In particular, the econometric analysis allows consideration of whether licence concession or mode of assignment encourages entry. The study finds that auction assignment processes only slightly increase the probability of entry, whilst price and quantity concessions have no impact.
Subjects: 
Market entry
global mobile telephone markets
3G spectrum assignment
JEL: 
D82
L51
L96
Document Type: 
Conference Paper

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