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Erscheinungsjahr: 
2010
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
IZA Discussion Papers No. 5382
Verlag: 
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA), Bonn
Zusammenfassung: 
This paper analyzes how electoral incentives affected the performance of a major decentralized conditional cash transfer program intended on reducing school dropout rates among children of poor households in Brazil. We show that while this federal program successfully reduced school dropout by 8 percentage points, the program's impact was 36 percent larger in municipalities governed by mayors who faced reelection possibilities compared to those with lame-duck mayors. First term mayors with good program performance were much more likely to get re-elected. These mayors adopted program implementation practices that were not only more transparent but also associated with better program outcomes.
Schlagwörter: 
decentralization
electoral incentives
conditional cash transfer
impact evaluation
JEL: 
D78
H43
I28
O15
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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