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Erscheinungsjahr: 
2010
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
IZA Discussion Papers No. 5374
Verlag: 
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA), Bonn
Zusammenfassung: 
Several studies have shown that dictator-game giving declines substantially if the dictator can exploit situational excuses for not being generous. In this experimental study we investigate if this result extends to more natural social interactions involving reciprocal behavior. We provide the second mover in a reciprocal game with an excuse for not reciprocating, an excuse which has previously been shown to strongly reduce giving in dictator games. We do not find that the availability of the excuse has any effect at all on reciprocal behavior, and conclude that reciprocity is a more stable disposition than dictator game generosity.
Schlagwörter: 
reciprocity
moral wiggle room
JEL: 
C72
C9
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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