Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/51992
Authors: 
Abeler, Johannes
Altmann, Steffen
Goerg, Sebastian J.
Kube, Sebastian
Wibral, Matthias
Year of Publication: 
2011
Series/Report no.: 
Discussion paper series // Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit 5727
Abstract: 
In this paper, we discuss recent evidence from economic experiments that study the impact of social preferences on workplace behavior. We focus on situations in which a single employer interacts with multiple employees. Traditionally, equity and efficiency have been seen as opposing aims in such work environments: individual pay-for-performance schemes maximize efficiency but might lead to inequitable outcomes. We present findings from laboratory experiments that show under which circumstances partially incomplete contracts can create equitable work environments while at the same time reaching surprisingly efficient outcomes.
Subjects: 
incentives
wage setting
equity
gift exchange
reciprocity
incomplete contracts
organizational economics
laboratory experiments
JEL: 
J33
D63
M52
C92
J41
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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