Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/51953 
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dc.contributor.authorBigoni, Mariaen
dc.contributor.authorFort, Margheritaen
dc.contributor.authorNardotto, Mattiaen
dc.contributor.authorReggiani, Tommasoen
dc.date.accessioned2011-10-12-
dc.date.accessioned2011-11-23T11:40:20Z-
dc.date.available2011-11-23T11:40:20Z-
dc.date.issued2011-
dc.identifier.piurn:nbn:de:101:1-201107283696en
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/51953-
dc.description.abstractThis paper assesses the effect of two stylized and antithetic non-monetary incentive schemes on students' effort. We collect data from a field experiment where incentives are exogenously imposed, performance is monitored and individual characteristics are observed. Students are randomly assigned to a tournament scheme that fosters competition between coupled students, a cooperative scheme that promotes information sharing and collaboration between students and a control treatment in which students can neither compete, nor cooperate. In line with theoretical predictions, we find that competition induces higher effort with respect to cooperation and cooperation does not increase effort with respect to the baseline. However, this is true only for men, while women do not seem to react to non-monetary incentives.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aInstitute for the Study of Labor (IZA) |cBonnen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aIZA Discussion Papers |x5844en
dc.subject.jelA22en
dc.subject.jelC93en
dc.subject.jelI20en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordeducationen
dc.subject.keywordfield experimentsen
dc.subject.keywordincentivesen
dc.subject.keywordcompetitionen
dc.subject.keywordcooperationen
dc.titleTeams or tournaments? A field experiment on cooperation and competition among university students-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn669693855en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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