Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/51947 
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dc.contributor.authorBossi, Lucaen
dc.contributor.authorGumus, Gulcinen
dc.date.accessioned2011-10-14-
dc.date.accessioned2011-11-23T11:40:11Z-
dc.date.available2011-11-23T11:40:11Z-
dc.date.issued2011-
dc.identifier.piurn:nbn:de:101:1-201108173937en
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/51947-
dc.description.abstractIn this paper, we set up a three-period stochastic overlapping generations model to analyze the implications of income inequality and mobility for demand for redistribution and social insurance. We model the size of two different public programs under the welfare state. We investigate bidimensional voting on the tax rates that determine the allocation of government revenues among transfer payments and old-age pensions. We show that the coalitions formed, the resulting political equilibria, and the demand for redistribution crucially depend on the level of income inequality and mobility.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aInstitute for the Study of Labor (IZA) |cBonnen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aIZA Discussion Papers |x5909en
dc.subject.jelD72en
dc.subject.jelH53en
dc.subject.jelH55en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordredistributionen
dc.subject.keywordmobilityen
dc.subject.keywordinequalityen
dc.subject.keywordstructure induced equilibriumen
dc.titleIncome inequality, mobility, and the welfare state: A political economy model-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn670009865en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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