Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/51947
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dc.contributor.authorBossi, Lucaen_US
dc.contributor.authorGumus, Gulcinen_US
dc.date.accessioned2011-10-14en_US
dc.date.accessioned2011-11-23T11:40:11Z-
dc.date.available2011-11-23T11:40:11Z-
dc.date.issued2011en_US
dc.identifier.piurn:nbn:de:101:1-201108173937en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/51947-
dc.description.abstractIn this paper, we set up a three-period stochastic overlapping generations model to analyze the implications of income inequality and mobility for demand for redistribution and social insurance. We model the size of two different public programs under the welfare state. We investigate bidimensional voting on the tax rates that determine the allocation of government revenues among transfer payments and old-age pensions. We show that the coalitions formed, the resulting political equilibria, and the demand for redistribution crucially depend on the level of income inequality and mobility.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aInstitute for the Study of Labor (IZA) |cBonnen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aDiscussion paper series // Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit |x5909en_US
dc.subject.jelD72en_US
dc.subject.jelH53en_US
dc.subject.jelH55en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordredistributionen_US
dc.subject.keywordmobilityen_US
dc.subject.keywordinequalityen_US
dc.subject.keywordstructure induced equilibriumen_US
dc.titleIncome inequality, mobility, and the welfare state: A political economy modelen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn670009865en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US

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