Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/51908
Authors: 
Brollo, Fernanda
Nannicini, Tommaso
Year of Publication: 
2011
Series/Report no.: 
Discussion paper series // Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit 5698
Abstract: 
This paper uses a quasi-experimental strategy to disclose utterly political reasons behind the allocation of intergovernmental transfers in a federal state. We apply a regression discontinuity design in close elections to identify the effect of political alignment on federal transfers to municipal governments in Brazil. We find that municipalities where the mayor is affiliated with the coalition of the Brazilian President receive larger (discretionary) infrastructure transfers by about 40% in pre-election years. This effect is mainly driven by the fact that the federal government penalizes municipalities run by mayors from the opposition coalition who won by a narrow margin, thereby tying their hands for the next election.
Subjects: 
federal transfers
political alignment
regression discontinuity
JEL: 
C21
D72
H77
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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