Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/51900 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2011
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
IZA Discussion Papers No. 5862
Verlag: 
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA), Bonn
Zusammenfassung: 
We examine rational learning among expert chess players and how they update their beliefs in repeated games with the same opponent. We present a model that explains how equilibrium play is affected when players change their choice of strategy when receiving additional information from each encounter. We employ a large international panel dataset with controls for risk preferences and playing skills whereby the latter accounts for ability. Although expert chess players are intelligent, productive and equipped with adequate data and specialized computer programs, we find large learning effects. Moreover, as predicted by the model, risk-averse players learn substantially faster.
Schlagwörter: 
rational learning
risk aversion
beliefs
JEL: 
C73
D83
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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