Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/51900
Authors: 
Gerdes, Christer
Gränsmark, Patrik
Rosholm, Michael
Year of Publication: 
2011
Series/Report no.: 
Discussion paper series // Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit 5862
Abstract: 
We examine rational learning among expert chess players and how they update their beliefs in repeated games with the same opponent. We present a model that explains how equilibrium play is affected when players change their choice of strategy when receiving additional information from each encounter. We employ a large international panel dataset with controls for risk preferences and playing skills whereby the latter accounts for ability. Although expert chess players are intelligent, productive and equipped with adequate data and specialized computer programs, we find large learning effects. Moreover, as predicted by the model, risk-averse players learn substantially faster.
Subjects: 
rational learning
risk aversion
beliefs
JEL: 
C73
D83
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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