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dc.contributor.authorSessions, John G.en
dc.contributor.authorSkåtun, John D.en
dc.date.accessioned2011-08-01-
dc.date.accessioned2011-11-23T11:38:21Z-
dc.date.available2011-11-23T11:38:21Z-
dc.date.issued2011-
dc.identifier.piurn:nbn:de:101:1-201104114042en
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/51870-
dc.description.abstractWhilst existing efficiency wage literature assumes detection probabilities of shirkers are exogenous, this paper finds them positively and endogenously dependent on non-shirkers' effort. It shares the result with the endogenous monitoring models where, in some regions, workers reduce effort in response to higher wages, but differs in that firms never operate in those regions. The paper further provides theoretical reasons for the empirical regularity that increased usage of performance related pay (PRP) flattens the pay-tenure profile. Wages and effort increase over the lifecycle, both with and without PRP, but with late payments in PRP falling short of pure wage arrangements.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aInstitute for the Study of Labor (IZA) |cBonnen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aIZA Discussion Papers |x5619en
dc.subject.jelJ33en
dc.subject.jelJ41en
dc.subject.jelJ54en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordmonitoringen
dc.subject.keywordtenureen
dc.subject.keywordefficiency wagesen
dc.subject.stwLeistungsentgelten
dc.subject.stwEffizienzlohnen
dc.subject.stwArbeitsleistungen
dc.subject.stwBetriebszugehörigkeiten
dc.subject.stwLeistungsbeurteilungen
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.titlePaid to perform? Compensation profiles under pure wage and performance related pay arrangements-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn665261977en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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