Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/51870
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dc.contributor.authorSessions, John G.en_US
dc.contributor.authorSkåtun, John D.en_US
dc.date.accessioned2011-08-01en_US
dc.date.accessioned2011-11-23T11:38:21Z-
dc.date.available2011-11-23T11:38:21Z-
dc.date.issued2011en_US
dc.identifier.piurn:nbn:de:101:1-201104114042en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/51870-
dc.description.abstractWhilst existing efficiency wage literature assumes detection probabilities of shirkers are exogenous, this paper finds them positively and endogenously dependent on non-shirkers' effort. It shares the result with the endogenous monitoring models where, in some regions, workers reduce effort in response to higher wages, but differs in that firms never operate in those regions. The paper further provides theoretical reasons for the empirical regularity that increased usage of performance related pay (PRP) flattens the pay-tenure profile. Wages and effort increase over the lifecycle, both with and without PRP, but with late payments in PRP falling short of pure wage arrangements.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aInstitute for the Study of Labor (IZA) |cBonnen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aDiscussion paper series // Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit |x5619en_US
dc.subject.jelJ33en_US
dc.subject.jelJ41en_US
dc.subject.jelJ54en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordmonitoringen_US
dc.subject.keywordtenureen_US
dc.subject.keywordefficiency wagesen_US
dc.subject.stwLeistungsentgelten_US
dc.subject.stwEffizienzlohnen_US
dc.subject.stwArbeitsleistungen_US
dc.subject.stwBetriebszugehörigkeiten_US
dc.subject.stwLeistungsbeurteilungen_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titlePaid to perform? Compensation profiles under pure wage and performance related pay arrangementsen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn665261977en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US

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