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dc.contributor.authorMarkussen, Simenen
dc.contributor.authorMykletun, Arnsteinen
dc.contributor.authorRøed, Knuten
dc.date.accessioned2011-10-17-
dc.date.accessioned2011-11-23T11:37:44Z-
dc.date.available2011-11-23T11:37:44Z-
dc.date.issued2010-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/51843-
dc.description.abstractCan activation requirements control moral hazard problems in public sickness absence insurance and accelerate recovery? Based on empirical analysis of Norwegian data, we show that it can. Activation requirements not only bring down benefit claims, they also reduce the likelihood that long-term sickness absence leads to inactivity. Our findings show that absentees who are issued graded (partial) absence certificates by their physician have shorter absences and higher subsequent employment rates than they would have had on regular sick leave. We conclude that the activation strategies that in recent years have permeated European and US welfare policy may fruitfully be carried over to sick leave insurance.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aInstitute for the Study of Labor (IZA) |cBonnen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aIZA Discussion Papers |x5343en
dc.subject.jelC26en
dc.subject.jelI18en
dc.subject.jelI38en
dc.subject.jelJ48en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordsick leaveen
dc.subject.keyworddisabilityen
dc.subject.keywordactivationen
dc.subject.keywordworkfareen
dc.titleThe case for presenteeism-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn670020451en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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