Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/51843
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dc.contributor.authorMarkussen, Simenen_US
dc.contributor.authorMykletun, Arnsteinen_US
dc.contributor.authorRøed, Knuten_US
dc.date.accessioned2011-10-17en_US
dc.date.accessioned2011-11-23T11:37:44Z-
dc.date.available2011-11-23T11:37:44Z-
dc.date.issued2010en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/51843-
dc.description.abstractCan activation requirements control moral hazard problems in public sickness absence insurance and accelerate recovery? Based on empirical analysis of Norwegian data, we show that it can. Activation requirements not only bring down benefit claims, they also reduce the likelihood that long-term sickness absence leads to inactivity. Our findings show that absentees who are issued graded (partial) absence certificates by their physician have shorter absences and higher subsequent employment rates than they would have had on regular sick leave. We conclude that the activation strategies that in recent years have permeated European and US welfare policy may fruitfully be carried over to sick leave insurance.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aInstitute for the Study of Labor (IZA) |cBonnen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aDiscussion paper series // Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit |x5343en_US
dc.subject.jelC26en_US
dc.subject.jelI18en_US
dc.subject.jelI38en_US
dc.subject.jelJ48en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordsick leaveen_US
dc.subject.keyworddisabilityen_US
dc.subject.keywordactivationen_US
dc.subject.keywordworkfareen_US
dc.titleThe case for presenteeismen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn670020451en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US

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