Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/51801 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2011
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
IZA Discussion Papers No. 5704
Verlag: 
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA), Bonn
Zusammenfassung: 
We study experimental markets in which participants face incentives modeled upon those prevailing in markets for managed funds. Each participant's portfolio is periodically evaluated at market value and ranked in a league table according to short-term paper returns. Those who rank highly attract a larger share of new fund inflows. Under conditions in which prices are close to intrinsic value, the effect of incentives is mild. However under conditions in which markets are prone to bubble, mispricing is greatly exacerbated by incentives. Even in experienced markets, prices climb to levels clearly indicative of speculation and do not always crash back.
Schlagwörter: 
league tables
price bubbles
managed funds markets
tournament incentives
asset market experiments
JEL: 
C92
G12
M52
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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