Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/51793 
Full metadata record
DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorSchwarz, Christianen
dc.contributor.authorSuedekum, Jensen
dc.date.accessioned2011-09-20-
dc.date.accessioned2011-11-23T11:35:32Z-
dc.date.available2011-11-23T11:35:32Z-
dc.date.issued2010-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/51793-
dc.description.abstractWe develop a theory of a firm in an environment with incomplete contracts. The firm's headquarter decides on the complexity, the organization, and the global scale of its production process. Specifically, it decides: i) on the mass of symmetric intermediate inputs that are part of the value chain, ii) if the supplier of each component is an external contractor or an integrated affiliate, and iii) if the supplier is offshored to a foreign low-wage country. Afterwards we consider a related scenario where the headquarter contracts with a given number of two asymmetric suppliers. Our model is consistent with several stylized facts from the recent literature that existing theories of multinational firms cannot account for.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aInstitute for the Study of Labor (IZA) |cBonnen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aIZA Discussion Papers |x5305en
dc.subject.jelF12en
dc.subject.jelD23en
dc.subject.jelL23en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordmultinational firmsen
dc.subject.keywordoutsourcingen
dc.subject.keywordintra-firm tradeen
dc.subject.keywordoffshoringen
dc.subject.keywordvertical FDIen
dc.titleGlobal sourcing of complex production processes-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn668563044en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

Files in This Item:
File
Size
883.06 kB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.