Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/51756
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dc.contributor.authorAlmeida, Rita K.en_US
dc.contributor.authorCarneiro, Pedroen_US
dc.date.accessioned2011-10-14en_US
dc.date.accessioned2011-11-23T11:34:38Z-
dc.date.available2011-11-23T11:34:38Z-
dc.date.issued2011en_US
dc.identifier.piurn:nbn:de:101:1-201108152092en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/51756-
dc.description.abstractEnforcement of labor regulations in the formal sector may drive workers to informality because they increase the costs of formal labor. But better compliance with mandated benefits makes it attractive to be a formal employee. We show that, in locations with frequent inspections workers pay for mandated benefits by receiving lower wages. Wage rigidity prevents downward adjustment at the bottom of the wage distribution. As a result, lower paid formal sector jobs become attractive to some informal workers, inducing them to want to move to the formal sector.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aInstitute for the Study of Labor (IZA) |cBonnen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aDiscussion paper series // Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit |x5902en_US
dc.subject.jelJ2en_US
dc.subject.jelJ3en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordinformalityen_US
dc.subject.keywordlabor regulationen_US
dc.titleEnforcement of labor regulation and informalityen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn669996955en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US

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