Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/51673 
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dc.contributor.authorGroßer, Jensen
dc.contributor.authorReuben, Ernestoen
dc.contributor.authorTymula, Agnieszkaen
dc.date.accessioned2011-09-27-
dc.date.accessioned2011-11-23T11:32:39Z-
dc.date.available2011-11-23T11:32:39Z-
dc.date.issued2010-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/51673-
dc.description.abstractWe experimentally study the common wisdom that money buys political influence. In the game, one lobbyist has the opportunity to influence redistributive tax policies in her favor by transferring money to two competing candidates. The success of the lobbying investment depends on whether or not the candidates are willing to respond and able to collude on lowtax policies that do not harm their relative chances in the elections. In the experiment, we find that lobbying is never successful when the lobbyist and candidates interact just once. By contrast, it yields substantially lower redistribution in about 40% of societies with finitelyrepeated encounters. However, lobbying investments are not always profitable, and profitsharing between the lobbyist and candidates depends on prominent equity norms. Our experimental results shed new light on the complex process of buying political influence in everyday politics and help explain why only relatively few corporate firms do actually lobby.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aInstitute for the Study of Labor (IZA) |cBonnen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aIZA Discussion Papers |x5332en
dc.subject.jelD72en
dc.subject.jelH10en
dc.subject.jelK42en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordlobbyingen
dc.subject.keywordredistributionen
dc.subject.keywordelectionsen
dc.subject.keywordbargainingen
dc.subject.keywordcollusionen
dc.titleTacit lobbying agreements: An experimental study-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn668943173en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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