Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/51594
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dc.contributor.authorHarbaugh, William T.en_US
dc.contributor.authorMocan, Nacien_US
dc.contributor.authorVisser, Michael S.en_US
dc.date.accessioned2011-10-11en_US
dc.date.accessioned2011-11-23T11:30:49Z-
dc.date.available2011-11-23T11:30:49Z-
dc.date.issued2011en_US
dc.identifier.piurn:nbn:de:101:1-201107042629en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/51594-
dc.description.abstractWe report results from economic experiments of decisions that are best described as petty larceny, with high school and college students who can anonymously steal real money from each other. Our design allows exogenous variation in the rewards of crime, and the penalty and probability of detection. We find that the probability of stealing is increasing in the amount of money that can be stolen, and that it is decreasing in the probability of getting caught and in the penalty for getting caught. Furthermore, the impact of the certainty of getting caught is larger when the penalty is bigger, and the impact of the penalty is bigger when the probability of getting caught is larger.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aInstitute for the Study of Labor (IZA) |cBonnen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aDiscussion paper series // Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit |x5813en_US
dc.subject.jelK4en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordcrimeen_US
dc.subject.keywordpunishmenten_US
dc.subject.keywordincentivesen_US
dc.subject.keyworddeterrenceen_US
dc.subject.keywordjuvenileen_US
dc.subject.keywordarresten_US
dc.subject.keywordrisken_US
dc.subject.keywordlarcenyen_US
dc.titleTheft and deterrenceen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn669592986en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US

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