Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/51561 
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dc.contributor.authorJeitschko, Thomas D.en
dc.contributor.authorNormann, Hans-Theoen
dc.date.accessioned2011-11-07-
dc.date.accessioned2011-11-21T17:05:32Z-
dc.date.available2011-11-21T17:05:32Z-
dc.date.issued2011-
dc.identifier.isbn978-3-86304-034-5en
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/51561-
dc.description.abstractWe contrast a standard deterministic signaling game with one where the signal-generating mechanism is stochastic. With stochastic signals a unique equilibrium emerges that involves separation and has intuitive comparative-static properties as the degree of signaling depends on the prior type distribution. With deterministic signals both pooling and separating configurations occur. Laboratory data support the theory: In the stochastic variant, there is more signaling behavior than with deterministic signals, and less frequent types distort their signals relatively more. Moreover, the degree of congruence between equilibrium and subject behavior is greater in stochastic settings compared to deterministic treatments.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aHeinrich Heine University Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE) |cDüsseldorfen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aDICE Discussion Paper |x35en
dc.subject.jelC7en
dc.subject.jelC9en
dc.subject.jelD8en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordexperimentsen
dc.subject.keywordlearningen
dc.subject.keywordnoiseen
dc.subject.keywordsignalingen
dc.subject.keywordstochastic environmentsen
dc.titleSignaling in deterministic and stochastic settings-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn671587641en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:dicedp:35en

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