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dc.contributor.authorRueda R., Miguel Ricardoen
dc.date.accessioned2010-02-23-
dc.date.accessioned2011-11-18T11:47:03Z-
dc.date.available2011-11-18T11:47:03Z-
dc.date.issued2008-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/51422-
dc.description.abstractThis paper studies the relationship between the hazard rate of the exit of a president of a central bank and a measure of credibility in monetary policy. The expected hazard rate of exit is estimated as a function of legal and political variables. The measure of credibility is the expected probability of a disinflation beginning when inflation is rising. For a sample of 22 Latin American and G7 countries, I find a negative relationship between the hazard rate of exit and the measure of credibility. This provides evidence of the expected relationship between independence and credibility not found in previous cross country studies. Using the executive's party ideology as a measure of aversion to inflation, there was no evidence that this relationship is different for countries where the government is identified as more conservative. However, when a president of the central bank appointed by a conservative government is in office, a rise in the probability of a disinflation beginning when inflation was rising was found. The results show that legal independence after controlling for the hazard rate of the president's exit is not associated with credibility gains.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aInter-American Development Bank, Research Department |cWashington, DCen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aWorking Paper |x639en
dc.subject.jelE50en
dc.subject.jelE58en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordcredibilityen
dc.subject.keywordcentral bank independenceen
dc.subject.keywordcentral bankersen
dc.titleBreaking credibility in monetary policy: The role of politics in the stability of the central banker-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn585732175en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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