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https://hdl.handle.net/10419/51364
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DC Field | Value | Language |
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dc.contributor.author | Apolte, Thomas | en |
dc.date.accessioned | 2011-11-17 | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2011-11-17T16:40:20Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2011-11-17T16:40:20Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2010 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/51364 | - |
dc.description.abstract | In this paper the political economy of revolutions is revisited, as it has been developed and applied in a number of publications by Acemoglu and Robinson. We criticize the fact that these authors abstract from collective-action problems and focus on inequality of income or wealth instead. In doing so, they reanimate a long but misleading tradition in social sciences, namely to directly deduct prospective group behavior from the collective interest of a group. We show that, because of collective-action problems, income inequality is not a sufficient condition for a revolution to occur. Furthermore, we also show that inequality does not even need to be a necessary condition, since all what is needed in order for a group to be interested in a revolution is that this group as a whole can expect to be a beneficiary of a revolution. For the latter to apply, however, inequality is not necessary. Hence, not inequality but rather a certain structure of commitment devices or their absence is crucial for explaining why revolutions sometimes occur and sometimes not. | en |
dc.language.iso | eng | en |
dc.publisher | |aWestfälische Wilhelms-Universität Münster, Centrum für Angewandte Wirtschaftsforschung (CAWM) |cMünster | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | |aCAWM Discussion Paper |x29 | en |
dc.subject.jel | D72 | en |
dc.subject.jel | D74 | en |
dc.subject.jel | O15 | en |
dc.subject.jel | P16 | en |
dc.subject.ddc | 330 | en |
dc.subject.keyword | Credible Commitments | en |
dc.subject.keyword | Dictatorship | en |
dc.subject.keyword | Political Economy | en |
dc.subject.keyword | Redistribution | en |
dc.title | Why is there no revolution in North-Korea? The political economy of revolution revisited | - |
dc.type | Working Paper | en |
dc.identifier.ppn | 672444933 | en |
dc.rights | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | en |
dc.identifier.repec | RePEc:zbw:cawmdp:29 | en |
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