Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/51364
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dc.contributor.authorApolte, Thomasen_US
dc.date.accessioned2011-11-17en_US
dc.date.accessioned2011-11-17T16:40:20Z-
dc.date.available2011-11-17T16:40:20Z-
dc.date.issued2010en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/51364-
dc.description.abstractIn this paper the political economy of revolutions is revisited, as it has been developed and applied in a number of publications by Acemoglu and Robinson. We criticize the fact that these authors abstract from collective-action problems and focus on inequality of income or wealth instead. In doing so, they reanimate a long but misleading tradition in social sciences, namely to directly deduct prospective group behavior from the collective interest of a group. We show that, because of collective-action problems, income inequality is not a sufficient condition for a revolution to occur. Furthermore, we also show that inequality does not even need to be a necessary condition, since all what is needed in order for a group to be interested in a revolution is that this group as a whole can expect to be a beneficiary of a revolution. For the latter to apply, however, inequality is not necessary. Hence, not inequality but rather a certain structure of commitment devices or their absence is crucial for explaining why revolutions sometimes occur and sometimes not.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aCAWM |cMünsteren_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aCAWM discussion paper / Centrum für Angewandte Wirtschaftsforschung Münster |x29en_US
dc.subject.jelD72en_US
dc.subject.jelD74en_US
dc.subject.jelO15en_US
dc.subject.jelP16en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordCredible Commitmentsen_US
dc.subject.keywordDictatorshipen_US
dc.subject.keywordPolitical Economyen_US
dc.subject.keywordRedistributionen_US
dc.titleWhy is there no revolution in North-Korea? The political economy of revolution revisiteden_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn672444933en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:cawmdp:29-

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