Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/51354
Authors: 
Dannenberg, Astrid
Löschel, Andreas
Paolacci, Gabriele
Reif, Christiane
Tavoni, Alessandro
Year of Publication: 
2011
Series/Report no.: 
ZEW Discussion Papers 11-065
Abstract: 
We explored experimentally how threshold uncertainty affects coordination success in a threshold public goods game. Whereas all groups succeeded in providing the public good when the exact value of the threshold was known, uncertainty was generally detrimental for the public good provision. The negative effect of threshold uncertainty was particularly severe when it took the form of ambiguity, i.e. when players were not only unaware of the value of the threshold but also of its probability distribution. Early signaling of willingness to contribute and share the burden equitably helped groups in coping with threshold uncertainty.
Subjects: 
Public good
threshold uncertainty
ambiguity
experiment
JEL: 
C72
C92
H41
Q54
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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