Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/51321
Autoren: 
Kratzsch, Uwe
Sieg, Gernot
Datum: 
2009
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Economics Department Working Paper Series No. 6
Zusammenfassung: 
Landing fees at airports are regulated almost all over the world since airports are assumed to abuse their market power. We find that monopolistic airports have an incentive to restrain landing fees when they generate additional non-aviation revenues and that the optimal landing fee decreases in the degree of complementarity of aviation and non-aviation. Furthermore, we show that monopolistic airports will not have an incentive to abuse their market power anymore so that a price regulation becomes inappropriate as soon as non-aviation revenues increase above 50% of all airport revenues.
Schlagwörter: 
airport regulation
aviation and non-aviation revenues
complementarity of aviation and non-aviation
locational rents
JEL: 
L93
D42
L51
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
1.71 MB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.