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dc.contributor.authorKratzsch, Uween
dc.contributor.authorSieg, Gernoten
dc.contributor.authorStegemann, Ulrikeen
dc.date.accessioned2011-07-05-
dc.date.accessioned2011-11-14T17:10:55Z-
dc.date.available2011-11-14T17:10:55Z-
dc.date.issued2011-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/51314-
dc.description.abstractThis paper analyzes greenhouse gas emissions that build up an atmospheric stock which depreciates over time. Weakly renegotiation- proof and subgame perfect equilibria in a game of international emission reduction exist if countries put a sufficiently high weight on future payoffs, even though there is a discontinuity in the required discount factor due to the integrity of the number of punishing countries. Treaties are easier to reach if the gas depreciates slowly.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aTechnische Universität Braunschweig, Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre |cBraunschweigen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aEconomics Department Working Paper Series |x11en
dc.subject.jelQ54en
dc.subject.jelF53en
dc.subject.jelH41en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordglobal warmingen
dc.subject.keywordinternational agreementen
dc.subject.keywordweak renegotiation-proofnessen
dc.subject.stwKlimaschutzen
dc.subject.stwUmweltabkommenen
dc.subject.stwVerhandlungstheorieen
dc.subject.stwTreibhausgasen
dc.subject.stwLuftverunreinigungen
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.titleAn international agreement with full participation to tackle the stock of greenhouse gases-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn663609720en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:tbswps:11en

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