Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/51314
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dc.contributor.authorKratzsch, Uween_US
dc.contributor.authorSieg, Gernoten_US
dc.contributor.authorStegemann, Ulrikeen_US
dc.date.accessioned2011-07-05en_US
dc.date.accessioned2011-11-14T17:10:55Z-
dc.date.available2011-11-14T17:10:55Z-
dc.date.issued2011en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/51314-
dc.description.abstractThis paper analyzes greenhouse gas emissions that build up an atmospheric stock which depreciates over time. Weakly renegotiation- proof and subgame perfect equilibria in a game of international emission reduction exist if countries put a sufficiently high weight on future payoffs, even though there is a discontinuity in the required discount factor due to the integrity of the number of punishing countries. Treaties are easier to reach if the gas depreciates slowly.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aTechn. Univ., Inst. für Volkswirtschaftslehre |cBraunschweigen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aEconomics Department Working Paper Series |x11en_US
dc.subject.jelQ54en_US
dc.subject.jelF53en_US
dc.subject.jelH41en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordglobal warmingen_US
dc.subject.keywordinternational agreementen_US
dc.subject.keywordweak renegotiation-proofnessen_US
dc.subject.stwKlimaschutzen_US
dc.subject.stwUmweltabkommenen_US
dc.subject.stwVerhandlungstheorieen_US
dc.subject.stwTreibhausgasen_US
dc.subject.stwLuftverunreinigungen_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titleAn international agreement with full participation to tackle the stock of greenhouse gasesen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn663609720en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:tbswps:11-

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