Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/51314
Authors: 
Kratzsch, Uwe
Sieg, Gernot
Stegemann, Ulrike
Year of Publication: 
2011
Series/Report no.: 
Economics Department Working Paper Series 11
Abstract: 
This paper analyzes greenhouse gas emissions that build up an atmospheric stock which depreciates over time. Weakly renegotiation- proof and subgame perfect equilibria in a game of international emission reduction exist if countries put a sufficiently high weight on future payoffs, even though there is a discontinuity in the required discount factor due to the integrity of the number of punishing countries. Treaties are easier to reach if the gas depreciates slowly.
Subjects: 
global warming
international agreement
weak renegotiation-proofness
JEL: 
Q54
F53
H41
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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