Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/51313
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dc.contributor.authorSieg, Gernoten_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-04-14en_US
dc.date.accessioned2011-11-14T17:10:54Z-
dc.date.available2011-11-14T17:10:54Z-
dc.date.issued2009en_US
dc.identifier.piurn:nbn:de:gbv:084-24464en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/51313-
dc.description.abstractGrandfather rights are currently used in the European Union to allocate airport slots. This article shows that airports prefer such a use-it-or-lose-it rule to unconditional property rights. Assuming that there are informational asymmetries between airports and air carriers because air carriers have better information on passenger demand, the use-it-or-lose-it rule increases slot use when demand for air transport is low. Airport prots increase and those of the air carriers, together with social welfare, decrease. The prot-maximizing rule is a use-it- g < 1-or-lose-it rule.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aInst. für Volkswirtschaftslehre |cBraunschweigen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aEconomics Department Working Paper Series |x4en_US
dc.subject.jelL93en_US
dc.subject.jelR48en_US
dc.subject.jelD42en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordAirportsen_US
dc.subject.keywordGrandfather rightsen_US
dc.subject.keyworduse-it-or-lose-it ruleen_US
dc.subject.keywordairport slotsen_US
dc.titleGrandfather rights in the market for airport slotsen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn594725747en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:tbswps:4-

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