Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/51313
Authors: 
Sieg, Gernot
Year of Publication: 
2009
Series/Report no.: 
Economics Department Working Paper Series 4
Abstract: 
Grandfather rights are currently used in the European Union to allocate airport slots. This article shows that airports prefer such a use-it-or-lose-it rule to unconditional property rights. Assuming that there are informational asymmetries between airports and air carriers because air carriers have better information on passenger demand, the use-it-or-lose-it rule increases slot use when demand for air transport is low. Airport prots increase and those of the air carriers, together with social welfare, decrease. The prot-maximizing rule is a use-it- g < 1-or-lose-it rule.
Subjects: 
Airports
Grandfather rights
use-it-or-lose-it rule
airport slots
JEL: 
L93
R48
D42
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size
1.63 MB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.