Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/50824 
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dc.contributor.authorDreher, Axelen
dc.contributor.authorSturm, Jan-Egberten
dc.contributor.authorVreeland, James Raymonden
dc.date.accessioned2011-11-01T13:36:49Z-
dc.date.available2011-11-01T13:36:49Z-
dc.date.issued2006-
dc.identifier.pidoi:10.3929/ethz-a-005277576en
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/50824-
dc.description.abstractWe investigate whether temporary members of the UN Security Council receive favorable treatment from the IMF, using panel data for 191 countries over the period 1951 to 2004. Our results indicate a robust positive relationship between temporary UN Security Council membership and participation in IMF programs, even after accounting for economic and political factors, as well as regional and country effects, and duration dependence. There is also evidence that UNSC membership reduces the number of conditions included in IMF programs. The size of the loan, however, is not affected by UNSC membership.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aETH Zurich, KOF Swiss Economic Institute |cZurichen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aKOF Working Papers |x151en
dc.subject.jelF33en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordIMFen
dc.subject.keywordUN Security Councilen
dc.subject.keywordVotingen
dc.subject.keywordAiden
dc.titleDoes membership on the UN security council influence IMF decisions? Evidence from panel data-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn520090586en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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